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THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND VOCAL LARCENY:
SOUNDING OFF ON SOUND-ALIKES
INTRODUCTION
"A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face."' Nevertheless, under
a doctrine called the right of publicity, states2 that permit a celebrity3 to
recover against an advertiser who imitates her appearance do not always
extend the same protection to the imitation of her voice.4
The right of publicity is a person's right to control the commercial
exploitation of his or her identity.5 As such, the right allows its holder6
to create an endorsement "by fusing the celebrity's identity with [a] prod-
uct and thereby siphoning some of the publicity value or good will in the
celebrity's persona into the product." 7 This fusion is accomplished by
associating the product with the celebrity's name, likeness8 or other per-
sonal attribute;9 however, the particular trait used is only a symbol of the
real source of publicity value-the celebrity's persona in its entirety.1°
1. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. The right of publicity is governed exclusively by state law. See infra notes 44-45
and accompanying text.
3. Right of publicity suits are generally brought by public figures or celebrities, see,
eg., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grant v. Esquire, Inc.,
367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), because only public figures' personae are en-
dowed with commercially exploitable value. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp.
1277, 1283 (D. Minn. 1970); Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation
of the Associative Value of Personality, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1199, 1202 (1986). While a
private person may have a right of publicity claim, the damages would probably be mini-
mal. See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.l 1 (9th
Cir. 1974); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 Law & Contemp.'Probs. 203, 217 (1954).
4. Compare, e.g., Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472
N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (recovery for visual impersonation), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d
1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985) with Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (applying New York law) (no recovery for vocal impersonation).
5. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 569, 575 (1977);
Carson, 698 F.2d at 834; Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202
F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953); McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer
and the Right of Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1703, 1704 (1987).
6. Notwithstanding its personal character, the right of publicity is considered a
property right. See, eg., Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573; Frazer, Appropriation of Personality-
A New Tort?, 99 Law Q. Rev. 281, 301 (1983); Treece, Commercial Exploitation of
Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories, 51 Tex. L. Rev. 637, 646-647 (1973). As such,
it may be freely alienated. See Nimmer, supra note 3, at 216.
7. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 834, 603 P.2d 425, 438, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 323, 336 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). The public's association of a product with
a well-known person can attract attention and influence opinions toward the product.
See, e.g., Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Treece, supra
note 6, at 644-646.
8. See Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(The right of publicity "protects the persona ... and thereby imbues his name or likeness
with commercial value marketable to those that seek such identification.").
9. See infra notes 88-121 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, infringements of the right should not hinge upon the attribute
used but upon whether the use evoked the "endorser's" identity."
Despite the right's broad characterization, it has traditionally been
limited to protect solely against appropriations of name or visual im-
age. 12 Nonetheless, courts in some jurisdictions have skirted tradition to
prevent the theft of other personal traits.' 3 Most recently, the right has
been used to redress the appropriation of the voice of a popular singer.' 4
In a typical case of vocal appropriation, an advertiser bypasses a celeb-
rity's refusal to endorse its product by employing a sound-alike to create
the false impression of the celebrity's aural presence. 5 The deceptive
aspect of this conduct has spurred plaintiffs to rely upon unfair competi-
tion and trademark law' 6 for relief, but without success."' The right of
publicity goes beyond these remedies, especially with respect to vocal ap-
11. See McCarthy, supra note 5, at 1709 ("Merely drawing attention to a product or
its advertisement through identifiable use of a person's identity is an infringement of the
right of publicity."); see also infra note 133 and accompanying text.
This is not to say, however, that every identifiable use of a person's identity is actiona-
ble. The first amendment grants to entertainers the freedom to parody without restraint
from the right of publicity. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1358
(D.N.J. 1981); Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 Yale L.J. 1577, 1605 (1979). This Note addresses commercial speech,
which enjoys some privilege, but not to the same degree. See Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562-563 (1980); S.E.C. v. American
Bd. of Trade, Inc., 830 F.2d 431, 442 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Economou v. S.E.C.,
108 S. Ct. 1118 (1988).
12. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
14. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). Appropriation of a
person's voice, for the purpose of this Note, is imitation of her voice. Appropriation by
using a tape recording of a person's actual voice is more properly considered under copy-
right law. Mere imitation of a person's voice is not actionable under copyright law be-
cause a person's voice is generally not fixed in a tangible medium of expression and the
Copyright Act of 1976 grants protection only to works that are fixed. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1982); infra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. Moreover, the legislative
history of the Copyright Act expressly intended to immunize the imitation of a voice
which is fixed in a sound recording from copyright liability. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Midler, 849 F.2d at 461, 463; Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
16. The Lanham Act encompasses both unfair competition and trademark claims.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982); see, e.g., SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Labs.,
Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1065 (3d Cir. 1980); see also infra note 65.
17. In the following cases, unfair competition and/or trademark claims failed to pre-
serve plaintiffs' rights in their distinctive aural qualities: Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (vocal imitation in context of song), cert. de-
nied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F.
Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (same); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (vocal imitation in commercial narration); Davis v. TWA, 297 F. Supp.
1145 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (vocal imitation in context of song); Sim v. H.J. Heinz Co., [1959]
1 W.L.R. 313 (C.A.) (English court of appeals) (vocal imitation in commercial narra-
tion); see also Supreme Records, Inc. v. Decca Records, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904 (S.D. Cal.
1950) (imitation of musical arrangement); Shaw v. Time-Life Records, 38 N.Y.2d 201,
341 N.E.2d 817, 379 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1975) (same); Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 11
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
propriation, and has provided relief where deception-based claims have
failed." In 1988, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set prece-
dent in Midler v. Ford Motor Co. 19 by holding that the right of publicity
may be infringed by the appropriation of a person's voice.20 Midler ac-
knowledged that modem advertising techniques can suggest an endorse-
ment by imitating a celebrity's unique vocal character" and then
followed established right of publicity principles by preserving Midler's
right to control the exploitation of her identity.22 In doing so, Midler
represents the most recent.of a line of cases23 that manifest a deeper un-
derstanding of the right of publicity and apply it expansively to counter
contemporary methods of appropriation.
In sharp contrast to these cases are those that adhere to the narrow
name or likeness precedent.24 The reluctance of these jurisdictions to
embrace an expansive view of the right reduces its effectiveness against
modem advertising practices and divorces enforcement of the right from
its purpose and underlying policies.
25
This Note proposes that the right of publicity should be extended to
protect against appropriations of voice. Part I summarizes the develop-
ment of the right of publicity. Part II draws support from statutes and
common law for the recognition of vocal appropriation as an infringe-
ment of the right of publicity. Part III advocates that the right of public-
ity must encompass voice in order to preserve the celebrity's ability to
control the use of her persona in today's technologically sophisticated
market.
I. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity developed from,2 6 and remains inexorably inter-
twined with,27 the right of privacy.2" This nexus probably exists because
A.D.2d 47, 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1960) (per curiam) (same), modified, 13 A.D.2d 473, 214
N.Y.S.2d 645, aff'd, 10 N.Y.2d 972, 180 N.E.2d 248, 224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961).
One plaintiff succeeded under an unfair competition theory. See Lahr v. Adell Chem.
Co., 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962); see also infra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 67.
19. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). Midler was the first case to recognize that the right
of publicity may be infringed by the appropriation of a person's voice.
20. See id. at 463.
21. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
22. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64.
23. See infra notes 88-121 and accompanying text.
24. See, eg., cases cited supra note 17; infra note 47.
25. See infra notes 122-39.
26. See, e.g., Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834, 837
(6th Cir. 1983); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D.N.J. 1981).
27. See Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 836 n.14, 603 P.2d 425, 439
n.14, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 337 n.14 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson
& Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 387, 280 N.W.2d 129, 132 (1979); Halpern, supra note 3, at
1200.
28. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis are the acknowledged theoretical architects
of the right of privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
1988]
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the same conduct-appropriation of an attribute of the plaintiff-in-
fringes both rights.29 Publicity plaintiffs, however, seek to protect an in-
terest distinct from that of privacy plaintiffs." Privacy plaintiffs do not
want their names or likenesses published at all because of the hurt feel-
ings and embarrassment resulting from the public exposure of what was
once private.31 In contrast, publicity plaintiffs do not object to the publi-
cation in and of itself. Rather, they seek to regulate the commercial ex-
ploitation of their already public identities in order to protect an
economic interest.32  The Supreme Court concisely summarized the dif-
ference between the two rights by noting that privacy plaintiffs seek to
"minimize publication of... damaging matter, while in 'right of public-
ity' cases the only question is who gets to do the publishing. 33
In 1953, the right of publicity was expressly recognized in Haelan Lab-
193 (1890). Their characterization of the right can be encapsulated as "the right to be let
alone." Id. at 193. As it developed, the right was used to remedy several different types
of invasions into personal solitude. See infra note 38. The right of publicity is an offshoot
of the type of privacy invasion that later became known as "appropriation, for the de-
fendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or likeness." See infra note 37 and accompa-
nying text. This aspect of the right of privacy was first recognized at the turn of the
century.
In 1902, an invasion of privacy action was brought against the Rochester Folding Box
Company for placing the plaintiff's picture on a box of flour without her consent. See
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The court
held that a lack of precedent prevented it from finding for the plaintiff. See id. at 543, 64
N.E. at 443. In 1903, in response to public disapproval of the decision, see, e.g., Lahiri v.
Daily Mirror, Inc., 162 Misc. 776, 778, 295 N.Y.S. 382, 384 (Sup. Ct. 1937), the New
York legislature enacted a statute to address the type of harm experienced by Roberson.
See infra notes 55, 66 and accompanying text. The statute is still in force today. See
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989). The right of privacy
was first recognized at common law when, in a scathing opinion, the Supreme Court of
Georgia criticized Roberson and recognized a common law right of privacy under similar
facts. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 211-20, 50 S.E. 68, 77-81
(1905).
29. See J. McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy § 5.8[C], at 5-62 (1988).
30. Another reason for the inadequacy of privacy precedent is that celebrities and
other public figures, by their voluntary entry into the public eye, are deemed to waive a
considerable degree of their right to privacy. See, e.g., Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745
F.2d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447
F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the
Law of Torts 859-60 (5th ed. 1984).
31. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975); Crump v. Beckley Newspa-
pers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 85 n.6 (W. Va. 1984).
32. See, e.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353-54 (D.N.J. 1981); Comment, The
Right of Publicity as a Means of Protecting Performers' Style, 14 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 129,
137 (1980); supra note 5 and accompanying text. But see Felcher & Rubin, supra note 11,
at 1613-14 (A privacy, not publicity, claim would be appropriate for a celebrity who does
not use her identity for marketing purposes because she would only experience emotional
injury.).
Although the right has economic underpinnings, it also allows a celebrity to maintain
her reputation and credibility by safeguarding her from unwilling associations with infer-
ior or otherwise undesirable products. See Treece, supra note 6, at 642.
33. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
oratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.34 The court in Haelan ac-
knowledged the unique interest of public figures and distinguished the
right of publicity from the right of privacy by differentiating the eco-
nomic harm from the emotional.35 Seven years after Haelan, Dean Pros-
ser published an influential law review article36 that included
"[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's name or
likeness"37 as one of the four torts constituting invasions of privacy.3 s
Unfortunately, Prosser's classification describes an infringement of the
right of publicity as well as an invasion of privacy. The confusion caused
by his failure to clearly establish the conceptual distinction between the
two 39 has been exacerbated by the adoption of his privacy formulation by
the Restatement (Second) of Torts," and by statute4 ' or common law42
in many states. As a result, many courts remain misguided as to the
differences between the two actions.43
Currently, twelve states have statutes that encompass an aspect of the
right of publicity by defining the act of appropriation as actionable.'
Only four states have expressly rejected a common law right of publicity,
34. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
35. See id.; see also supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
36. See Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
37. Id. at 389.
38. Prosser's vision of the right to privacy encompasses four separate torts that share
the common feature of invading the right to be let alone. See id. at 383-89.
39. See J. McCarthy, supra note 29, § 1.5[D], at 1-26. Compare Prosser, supra note
36, at 406 ("The interest protected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one .... Its
proprietary nature is clearly indicated by [Haelan].") with id. at 408 ("As to any of the
four [types of privacy], it is agreed that the plaintiff's right is a personal one .... ).
40. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652C, at 380 (1977) ("One who appropri-
ates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the
other for invasion of his privacy.").
41. The following statutes address the act of appropriation of a name or visual like-
ness without limiting it to privacy or publicity: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08 (West 1988);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214, § 3A (Law. Co-op 1986) (construed to include the right of
publicity in Bi-Rite Enters. v. Bruce Miner Poster Co., 616 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Mass.
1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1985)); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney
1976 & Supp. 1989) (construed to include the right of publicity in Stephano v. News
Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220,
224 (1984)); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 839.1 (West 1983); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-28
(1985); Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-40 (1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.50 (West 1983 & Supp.
1988).
42. See, e.g., Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 646, 391 N.E.2d 54, 57 (1979);
McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law).
43. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The failure to discriminate between
the rights of privacy and publicity may have been partially responsible for the New York
Court of Appeals' decision to snuff out the right of publicity at common law. See
Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584,
485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984). For a more complete analysis of Stephano, see infra notes
59-75 and accompanying text.
44. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 391.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984) (expressly men-
tions right of publicity); Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West Supp. 1989) (does not mention right
of publicity); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-202 (1987); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-25-1101 to -1108
19881
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but these states have recognized the right statutorily.45  Despite the
sweeping acceptance of the right of publicity by those states that have
considered it, only one court has held that the imitation of a person's
voice constitutes an infringement of the right.4 6
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LAW
Right of publicity law has developed along two lines. The first retains
the traditional notion of the right as limited to appropriations of name or
likeness47 and is thus an exclusive and narrow view. The second view
discards the name or likeness standard in favor of an expansive concep-
tion of the persona in toto.as
The name or likeness traditionalists approach the right illogically. In-
stead of looking to the interest that the right protects-the celebrity's
control of her identity-they define the right by the manner in which it
was first irifringed.49 In doing so, the traditionalists adopt Prosser's pri-
vacy doctrine50 as the source of publicity law.
Under the second view, which is broad and inclusive, an advertiser's
use of anything that identifies a particular plaintiff infringes her right of
publicity. This expansive "identification" approach remains faithful to
the wisdom of Nimmer and McCarthy,5 the seminal publicity authori-
ties. Moreover, because it premises liability upon whether the alleged
appropriator suggested or identified the plaintiff, it serves the interest
that the right protects. 2
A comparison of analyses under both the traditional and expansive
views confirms the soundness of the latter and justifies a uniform expan-
sion of the scope of the right of publicity.53
(1988) (same); Utah Code Ann. §§ 45-3-1 to -5 (1988) (same); see also supra note 41
(listing statutes that address appropriation of name and visual likeness).
45. See infra note 53.
46. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
47. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 676 (1lth Cir. 1983); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Halpern, supra note 3, at 1244
(identity is routinely evoked by name or likeness).
48. See Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (appropriation
of performing style); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d
129 (1979) (appropriation of nickname). Some courts have gone beyond personal charac-
teristics to recognize appropriations of things associated with the plaintiff. See Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (phrase associated
with plaintiff); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974) (plaintiff's racing car).
49. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867-68
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
50. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 132-39.
53. States treat the right of publicity in one of three ways: 1) by common law only; 2)
by statute that is cumulative to the common law; or 3) by statute that codifies the com-
mon law. States in the first and second categories, see supra text accompanying note 45,
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Name or Likeness-New York's Traditional View
Statutory protection for the right of publicity in New York 4 is found
in New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51. 55 The statute ad-
dresses the act of appropriation under the privacy rubric and limits
claims to appropriations of "name, portrait or picture. ' 56 Therefore, the
statute typifies the restrictive name or likeness approach because even the
most liberal reading of "name, portrait or picture" would not likely in-
can adopt an expanded right of publicity because of the common law's inherent flexibil-
ity.
Of the six states in the second category, three can accommodate the right at common
law because their statutes are expressly cumulative. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(g) (West
Supp. 1989); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 540.08 (West 1988); Utah Code Ann. §§ 45-3-1 to -6
(1988). Three other states have vindicated the right at common law despite their statutes'
silence regarding common law rights. See McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613
P.2d 737, 739 (Okla. 1980); Elvis Presley Int'l Memorial Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d
89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 396-97,
280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (1979).
The four states in the third category pose obstacles to expanding the right because their
courts refuse to hear common law claims. See Carson v. National Bank of Commerce
Trust & Savs., 501 F.2d 1082, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (applying Nebraska
law) (based on erroneous view that Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73
N.W.2d 803 (1955), a right of privacy case, sets precedent for a publicity case); Stephano
v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d 580, 584, 485
N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984); Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, Inc.
(PACE), 122 R.I. 429, 431-32, 408 A.2d 608, 609 (1979); Brown v. American Broadcast-
ing Co., 704 F.2d 1296, 1302 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying Virginia law). Only in Rhode
Island and Virginia, however, are voice plaintiffs left conclusively without a right of pub-
licity remedy. Although the right of publicity was not recognized at common law in
Carson, Nebraska's statute may be receptive to voice because it grants protection to the
additional element of "personality." See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 20-202 (1987). In New York,
the possibility exists that Stephano did not preempt the right regarding vocal appropria-
tions. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. Furthermore, there may be a statu-
tory remedy available to New York voice plaintiffs in the near future. See infra note 80.
Finally, in two states, the right's ability to absorb the attribute of voice is uncertain.
Whether Kentucky's statute leaves room for interpretation or common law rights is un-
clear because no cases have construed it. In Massachusetts, the right of publicity exists
solely by statute. See Bi-Rite Enters. v. Bruce Miner Poster Co., 616 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D.
Mass. 1984), aff'd, 757 F.2d 440 (lst Cir. 1985); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 214, § 3A (Law.
Co-op 1986). However, the statute's applicability to voice is uncertain because, although
the statute was modeled on New York Civil Rights Law § 51, cases construing the New
York statute are not controlling in Massachusetts. See Tropeano v. Atlantic Monthly
Co., 379 Mass. 745, 747-48, 400 N.E.2d 847, 849 (1980).
54. New York is an important jurisdiction in right of publicity litigation. It was the
first state to enact an applicable statute, see supra note 28, and was the first state to hear
an appropriation case. See id. In addition, it has reported a large number of privacy/
publicity cases.
55. New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1989). The stat-
ute provides that "[a]ny person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state
for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent first
obtained... may... restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for
any injuries sustained by reason of such use." Id. § 51. Section 50 is the criminal coun-
terpart of § 51. Both are components of Article 5 of the Civil Rights Law, which is
entitled "Right of Privacy." N.Y. Civ. Rights Law Art. 5 (McKinney 1976).
56. See supra note 55.
1988]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
elude voice.57
Despite the narrow wording of the statute, an expansive right of pub-
licity began to develop under a line of federal cases that perceived an
independent, common law right of publicity in New York." However,
in 1984, the New York Court of Appeals, in Stephano v. News Group
Publications, Inc.," rejected the reasoning of these cases and apparently
extinguished the right at common law.' Moreover, any hope for a lib-
eral construction of the statute was dashed by Stephano's decidedly strict
emphasis on statutory language,6' a message which has been received by
courts62 and litigants 63 alike. 4 Consequently, publicity plaintiffs must
57. See Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 258 (1st Cir. 1962) (voice held not
within the contemplation of § 51); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc.
2d 603, 609, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 259 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (same), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488
N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985).
58. Judicial recognition of a common law right of publicity in New York has been
polarized into federal and state court factions. The federal courts interpreting New York
law have consistently recognized a common law right of publicity separate from the right
of privacy under § 51. See, e.g., Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188,
1198-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288, 290
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
The state courts, however, have never authoritatively acknowledged the existence of a
common law right of publicity, but have allowed the federal courts to develop the doc-
trine outside the confines of §§ 50-51. See Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day and Night
Co., 523 F. Supp. 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir.
1982); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 435-40, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1009-12
(1981).
59. 64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
60. See id. at 183, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224 ("Since the 'right of pub-
licity' is ... exclusively statutory in this State, the plaintiff cannot claim an independent
common-law right of publicity."). This case concerned the complaint of a model whose
picture was used in New York magazine without his permission. The dispute was re-
solved in favor of the magazine on constitutional grounds, the court finding that the first
amendment requires that newsworthy publications be exempt from application of § 51.
See id. at 184, 474 N.E.2d at 584-85, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224-25.
61. See id. at 183, 474 N.E.2d at 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 224 ("By its terms the statute
applies to any use of a person's picture or portrait. .. ").
62. See, e.g., Freihofer v. Hearst Corp., 65 N.Y.2d 135, 140, 480 N.E.2d 349, 353, 490
N.Y.S.2d 735, 739 (1985); Halpern, supra note 3, at 1212-13; J. McCarthy, supra note 29,§ 6.9[A], at 6-54 to 6-55. Courts have refused to give the statute the broad reading it
enjoyed prior to Stephano. See, e.g., Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 623-
24 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (look-alike actionable only if his resemblance to plaintiff is uncontro-
vertible); Moreno v. Time, Inc., 11 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2196, 2200 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1985) (statute does not extend protection to assumed or trade name, "Senor Wences").
63. Most post-Stephano cases have focused on the § 51 "newsworthy" exception, see,
e.g., Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1315, 1319-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), rev'd, No. 88-7734 (2d Cir. March 14, 1989); Bytner v. Capital Newspapers, 67
N.Y.2d 914, 916, 492 N.E.2d 1228, 1228, 501 N.Y.S.2d 812, 812 (1986), presumably
because Stephano slammed the door on litigation seeking a broad reading of the statutory
identification parameters.
64. The Stephano decision, as judicial ratification of the statute's traditional ap-
proach, seems particularly distressing in light of prior cases that attempted to broaden the
statute by recognizing claims for the use of attributes which did not fit the literal defini-
tion of "name, portrait or picture." See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-
27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (nickname and artist's rendering of plaintiff); Negri v. Schering
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either frame their complaints in other theories65 or shoehorn them into
the antiquated confines66 of the New York Civil Rights Law. These al-
ternatives provide small consolation to victims of vocal piracy. Unfair
competition, trademark and anti-dilution law offer sporadic relief at
best,67 and the statute excludes voice by conspicuous omission. 6s
For voice plaintiffs, however, Stephano may have a silver lining. The
Corp., 333 F. Supp. 101, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (picture of plaintiff as she looked forty
years before the litigation); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 379, 382-84, 472
N.E.2d 307, 307-08, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458-59 (1984) (photograph of plaintiff which did
not include her face); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 623,
396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 666 (1977) (Titone, J. & Suozzi, J., dissenting in part, concurring in
part) (contextual elements of New Years Eve); Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc.,
122 Misc. 2d 603, 611-16, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 261-64 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (look-alike of plain-
tiff), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985); Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc.,
175 Misc. 1027, 1027, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (1941) (mannequin resembling plaintiff).
65. Plaintiffs may find relief in unfair competition, see, ag., Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co.,
300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962); Waring v. WDAS, 327 Pa. 433, 455-56, 194 A. 631,
641-42 (1937), or trademark law, see generally Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp.
612, 624-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (possible recovery under § 51 denied in favor of easier rem-
edy under trademark). It has been suggested that anti-dilution law would be receptive to
publicity claims. See N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1988, at 1, col. 1, at 7, col. 2. Dilution is the
"blurring" or "tarnishing" of the goodwill associated with a producer's trademark. See
Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 (2d Cir. 1983); see also N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law § 368-d (McKinney 1984). However, all of these remedies are incomplete. See
infra note 67.
66. New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51 was enacted in 1903 as a response to Rober-
son v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) and contemplated
only the specific situation that Roberson presented-appropriation of name or likeness.
See Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1321, 449
N.Y.S.2d 941, 943 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983); Gordon, Right of Property
in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 553, 557-58 (1960).
67. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. The alternative remedies of unfair
competition and trademark are not adequate substitutes because they require a likelihood
of public confusion as to the plaintiff's association with the defendant's goods. See J.
McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23:1 (1973). A right of publicity
claim would lie even if there were no confusion. See University of Notre Dame Du Lac v.
J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1983). To wit, a dis-
claimer will eliminate confusion, and thus nullify the unfair competition and trademark
claims, but will fuel the publicity action by calling attention to the plaintiff, thereby trad-
ing on his identity. See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 629 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); Halpern, supra note 3, at 1246 & n.268.
Furthermore, some states require that the defendant's spurious conduct result in direct
competition to the plaintiff before granting relief under an unfair competition theory.
See, e.g., Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir.
1987). Since the defendant, an advertiser or manufacturer, does not compete directly
with the plaintiff, a celebrity, see, eg., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d
711, 714 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971); Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 348 (S.D.N.Y 1973), unfair competition would be inadequate in
those jurisdictions. Moreover, although trademark law does not preclude a distinctive
sound from functioning as a trademark, see In re General Elec. Broadcasting Co., 199
U.S.P.Q. 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978), it is doubtful that the bare sound of a voice would
qualify as a mark. See Booth, 362 F. Supp. at 348. Anti-dilution law is also a dubious
remedy if the claim is essentially to vindicate plaintiff's right of publicity. See Allen v.
Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (§ 368-d claim was
equivalent to right of publicity claim and cognizable only under Civil Rights Law).
68. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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court adopted the traditional view of the right of publicity by defining it
with respect to "name, portrait or picture."69 It then held that, "in this
respect," the statute is exclusive and preempts common law publicity
rights.70 Implicitly, Stephano left open the possibility that claims which
are not contemplated by the statute, such as vocal appropriation, may
survive at common law.71 Indeed, one month after Stephano, New
York's highest court, in Southeast Bank N.A. v. Lawrence,72 explicitly
reserved judgment "upon the question of whether a common-law...
right of publicity exists in this State."'73 The Court of Appeals' refusal to
address the lower court's affirmative answer to that "question" 74 is con-
troversial in light of its decision one month before in Stephano. The fa-
cial inconsistency of Southeast Bank and Stephano may presage the
survival of publicity rights beyond the statute.75
Stephano notwithstanding, commentators have criticized the statute
for providing inadequate protection to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate pri-
vacy or publicity rights.76 Because New York Civil Rights Law section
51 was enacted at the turn of the century and in response to the appropri-
ation of a visual likeness, 77 it reflects neither the present concerns of pub-
69. See Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174, 183, 474 N.E.2d
580, 584, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220, 224 (1984).
70. See id.
71. See T. Selz & M. Simensky, 2 Entertainment Law § 19.03D, at 2S-125 to -126
(1988).
72. 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
73. Id. at 912, 489 N.E.2d at 745, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 776.
74. See Southeast Bank, 104 A.D.2d 213, 219, 483 N.Y.S.2d 218, 223 (1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 66 N.Y.2d 910, 489 N.E.2d 744, 498 N.Y.S.2d 775 (1985).
75. This interpretation of Stephano is further supported in Freihofer v. Hearst Corp.,
65 N.Y.2d 135, 480 N.E.2d 349, 490 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1985). In Freihofer, the court limited
application of the statute to those appropriations to which it expressly applies. See id. at
140, 480 N.E.2d at 353, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 739; see also Dukas v. D.H. Sawyer & Associ-
ates, Ltd., 137 Misc. 2d 218, 220 & n.2, 520 N.Y.S.2d 306, 307-08 & n.2 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(tacitly acknowledged survival of common law right of publicity with respect to voice by
ignoring Stephano and implying that, but for the newsworthy exemption, claim for vocal
appropriation might have been colorable).
76. See Greenawalt, New York's Right of Privacy: The Need for Change, 42 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 159, 162 n.13 (1975) ("[T]he legislative response to [Roberson] was not intended
to foreclose other claims ... and ... that response should not be interpreted as 'preempt-
ing' the field."); see also J. McCarthy, supra note 29, § 6.9[A], at 6-56 (quoting S. Hof-
stadter & G. Horowitz, The Right of Privacy 29 (1964)); infra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text. Courts and commentators have argued for a liberal construction of
the statute. For example, a New York court stated:
While the statute may not, by its terms, cover voice or movement, characteris-
tics or style, it is intended to protect the essence of the person, his or her iden-
tity or persona ....
... A person may be known not only by objective indicia... but by other
characteristics as well-voice, movement, style, coiffure, [and] typical phrases.
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 610-12, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254,
260-61 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1985); see also
Gordon, supra note 66, at 566.
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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lie figures nor current methods of exploitation.7" Clearly, lawmakers in
1903 could not foresee methods of appropriation that would arise half a
century later.79 Now, corrective legislation is long overdue.8 0
B. Identification-The Expansive View
1. California
California81 is the only state that grants express statutory protection to
a person's voice.82 However, the statute has been interpreted to prohibit
only the appropriation of a person's actual voice, not its imitation.8 3
Nevertheless, because the term "likeness" has been construed elsewhere
to include visual impersonations,8 4 the argument could be made that the
statutory parameters of "likeness" and '"voice" should be read together
to include vocal impersonations.85 Although the court in Midler could
have reached this conclusion, it chose instead to rely on common law
grounds.8
6
The common law of California has generally been receptive to right of
78. See infra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
79. See Onassis, 122 Misc. 2d at 609, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 259 ("[T]he possibility of repro-
ducing and disseminating the sound of a voice was not contemplated in 1903 when sec-
tions 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law were first enacted."); Gordon, supra note 66, at
554 (early drafters and old decisions were unable to foresee the advance of media and the
marketability of personality).
80. See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 624 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
New York State Senator Emanuel Gold is preparing to introduce an amendment to the
Civil Rights Law. See FAX Transmittal from Senator Gold's office (March 15, 1989)(available in the files of the Fordham Law Review). The amendment proposes to modern-
ize the right of publicity in New York, with respect to its descendibility, by updating the
statutory parameters to "voice, signature, photograph or likeness [and the] imitation,
simulation or impersonation thereof, even if a disclaimer is used." Id. If passed, this law
would enable the successors-in-interest of deceased celebrities whose voices were appro-
priated to recover. See id.
81. California, home of many celebrity plaintiffs, is an important jurisdiction because
it has been a fertile source of right of publicity litigation. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498
F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
82. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1989) ("Any person who knowingly
uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling.., without
such person's prior consent ... shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person
83. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463; supra note 14.
84. Visual impersonations are representations that are neither the actual plaintiff nor
his picture. See, eg., Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 680 (11th Cir. 1983) (sculpted bust of plaintiff);
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 611-16, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254,
261-63 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (look-alike of plaintiff), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943
(1985).
85. See N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1988, at 3, col. 1, at 4, col. 4.
86. Unlike other statutes, see supra note 53, § 3344 is expressly in addition to rights at
common law. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(g) (West Supp. 1989). Possibly because its
rights are cumulative and plaintiffs can do better at common law, § 3344 has not fre-
quently been used. See J. McCarthy, supra note 29, § 6.4[A], at 6-16.
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publicity claims.87 In Motschenbacher v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co.,88
the defendant attempted to convey the impression that famous race car
driver Lothar Motschenbacher endorsed Winston cigarettes by using pic-
tures of his car in its commercial.8 9 Although Motschenbacher was not
visible in the ad, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
image of his car had the same legal consequence as would an image of
Motschenbacher himself because viewers would believe that he was at
the wheel.90 The car, as suggestive of Motschenbacher himself, carried
with it the power to convey his endorsement. In looking to whether the
commercial suggested Motschenbacher, rather than whether his name or
likeness was used, the court implicitly established "identification" of the
plaintiff, irrespective of the means used to identify, as the threshold of
liability.91 Thus, the court adopted an expansive interpretation of the
right of publicity.
In Midler v. Ford Motor Co. ,9 the defendant asked actress and singer
Bette Midler to re-record the song "Do You Wanna Dance" for musical
accompaniment to its commercial. 93 When she refused, the defendant
instructed a Midler sound-alike to mimic her performance of the song,94
and thereby misled listeners into believing that they were actually hear-
ing Midler.9 ' The Ninth Circuit drew upon Motschenbacher to explain
how Midler's proprietary interest was invaded by the appropriation of an
attribute of her identity, namely, her voice.96 Common to both cases was
the significance each placed on the stolen attribute's ability to identify the
respective plaintiffs and extract their endorsement value.97 Notwith-
standing that link, Midler easily remained within the far reaching impli-
cations of Motschenbacher because a car is not a personal characteristic
but the "human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is
manifested."9
87. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.
1974); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
88. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
89. See id. at 822.
90. The court stated:
Having viewed a film of the commercial, we agree with the district court that
the "likeness" of plaintiff is itself unrecognizable; however, the court's further
conclusion.., that the driver is not identifiable as plaintiff is erroneous in that it
wholly fails to attribute proper significance to the distinctive decorations ap-
pearing on the car.... [T]hese markings were not only peculiar to the plain-
tiff's cars but they caused some persons to think the car in question was
plaintiff's and to infer that the person driving the car was the plaintiff.
Id. at 827.
91. See infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
92. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
93. See id. at 461.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 463.
96. See id.
97. See id.; Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 826-27 (9th
Cir. 1974).
98. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
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Midler is important for several reasons. In holding that the right of
publicity may be infringed by the appropriation of a voice,99 it set valua-
ble precedent for voice plaintiffs. In addition, it fortified the notion that
identification of the plaintiff by any means is the key to right of publicity
infringements.100 Finally, Midler dispensed with the copyright preemp-
tion10' defense,102 which had previously proved fatal to publicity
claims'03 in sing-alike cases."m In doing so, the court emphasized that
Midler claimed rights in her persona,10 5 not in her song.10 6 Framed this
way, the state claim did not clash with federal copyright law'017 and,
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Simply put, state claims that are equivalent to and deal with the same subject
matter as copyright are preempted by federal law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1982).
102. The defense proceeds on the allegation that the plaintiff was identified not from an
imitation of her non-distinctive voice, but from a song which the public associates with
her. See Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 716 & n.12 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971). Because copyright law controls the rights sur-
rounding musical works, see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982), the song must be severed, thus
leaving the right of publicity claim vacuous without the song's context to establish identi-
fication of the plaintiff. See Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716; Motown Record Corp. v. George A.
Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1240-41 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
103. It has been suggested that an advertiser can avoid the publicity claim by securing
a license to use the plaintiff's recording of the song from the record company. See Ent. L.
& Fin., Dec. 1988, at 5, cols. 2-3. This type of license was granted to Nike when it used
The Beatles' song "Revolution" to advertise its running shoe. See Capitol Industries-
EMI, Inc., Press Release (July 28, 1987). Arguably, the license is paramount and the
artist's exercise of publicity rights would clash with the advertiser's exercise of copyrights
in the sound recording. Cf. Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 678 n.26 (7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's right of publicity claim is pre-
empted because it conflicts with defendant's copyright in videotape of baseball game),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987). But see infra note 107 (discussing possibility of valid
publicity claim despite defendant's copyright in sound recording).
However, the situation is different when the advertiser only has a license to use the
underlying song, not the sound recording, and attempts to re-create the recorded version
by using a sound-alike. See Miller, Gonna Hawk Around the Clock Tonight, Mother
Jones, Nov. 1988, at 39, 41 (adapted from M. Miller, Boxed In: The Culture of TV
(1988)). In these instances, the advertiser is seeking to capitalize on the version of the
song with which the public is familiar without paying the record company or artist for its
use. Here, the artist's remedy is the right of publicity.
104. See, e.g., Sinatra, 435 F.2d at 716; Motown, 657 F. Supp. at 1238-41.
105. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
106. The plaintiff only seeks to enjoin the one particular use of the song that imitates
her own rendition. See id. at 462.
107. In this application, the right of publicity is not equivalent to a right of copyright,
see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982); 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright
§ 1.01[B][1], at 1-12 (1988), because the right of publicity involves an extra element:
If under state law the act of reproduction, performance; distribution or display
... will in itself infringe the state created right, then such right is preempted.
But if other elements are required, in addition to or instead of, the acts of repro-
duction, performance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a state cre-
ated cause of action, then the right does not lie 'within the general scope of
copyright', and there is no preemption.
Id. § 1.01[B][1], at 1-13; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723
F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'don other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). But see Mayer
v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (state right
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therefore, escaped preemption. 08
2. Other Jurisdictions
Although right of publicity litigation occurs mainly in New York and
California, where celebrities and advertisers are concentrated, the law is
also developing in other states. Some of the strongest support for the
expansive view can be found between the two coasts.
In Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 09 ex-football player Elroy
"Crazylegs" Hirsch sued the defendant for marketing pantyhose under
the name "Crazylegs."" The defendant's promotions were set in an
athletic context,"' thus confirming that identification with Hirsch was
intended. The court, construing Wisconsin law, held that the combina-
tion of the nickname and the athletic flavor of the ads identified Hirsch
even though his real name was not used.11 2 Despite the court's reliance
on the athletic context to identify the plaintiff, Hirsch represents only a
gradual abandonment of name or likeness tradition because liability still
derived primarily from the use of a name by which the plaintiff was
known. The ad's athletic setting merely confirmed the defendant's refer-
must be qualitatively different from a copyright to survive preemption). It is not the
defendant's mere performance of the song, but rather its performance in a manner in-
tended to simulate the plaintiff that infringes her right of publicity. Restricting only the
imitation of an aspect of a performance which is fixed and copyrighted does not conflict
with the broader right of the copyright holder to perform the work in non-imitative ways.
See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462; J. McCarthy, supra note 29, § 4.14[E][3], at 4-94; Comment,
supra note 32, at 141.
Moreover, the subject matter of the right of publicity cannot be the subject matter of
copyright. The intangible identity of the plaintiff does not constitute a "writing," see 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982), subject to protection. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462; Factors Etc.,
Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
652 F.2d 278 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
There is also a more basic, yet untried, argument against preemption. Publicity claims
should be actionable regardless of the exclusive, but limited, rights of the copyright
holder. See generally Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 509, 566-75 (dis-
cussing cases that allowed state laws to limit the exercise of valid copyrights). In Factors
Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
652 F.2d 278 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982), the court held that publicity rights
"cannot be defeated by the defendants' attempt to copyright individual items." Id. at
1100. Under Factors, a publicity claim could trump a defendant's valid copyright in a
sound recording. While this conclusion is inconsistent with Baltimore Orioles. Inc. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
941 (1987) (discussed supra note 103), Nimmer believes Baltimore Orioles was wrongly
decided. See 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 1.01[B], at 1-22.3 to
1-22.4; id. § 2.09[F], at 2-138.1 to 2-138.2. Moreover, if the Factors reasoning is incor-
rect, any state law that provides a cause of action for the unpermitted use of a person's
photograph, see, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1989), is threatened with
preemption because that photograph may also be copyrighted.
108. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
109. 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979).
110. See id. at 382, 280 N.W.2d at 130.
111. See id. at 398, 280 N.W.2d at 138.
112. See id. at 397-98, 280 N.W.2d at 137-38.
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ence to Hirsch."' 3 However, in extending "name" to "nickname" and
looking to external contextual elements," 4 Hirsch underscored the im-
portance of identification 5 and departed from traditional precedent.
In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 16 the defendant mar-
keted his portable toilet with the phrase "Here's Johnny" followed by the
slogan "The World's Foremost Commodian," hoping that the clever
puns would generate interest and attract customers.1 17 Tonight Show
host Johnny Carson based his right of publicity claim on the defendant's
unauthorized use of the phrase "Here's Johnny," which the public com-
monly associates with him.1 8 The court, applying Michigan law, deter-
mined that the crux of the claim was appropriation of Carson's persona,
rather than his name or likeness," 9 and held for the plaintiff.2 ° More-
over, Carson explicitly rejected the obsolete name or likeness criteria by
dismissing those traditional methods of appropriation as irrelevant.1
2 1
The court's shift in emphasis from the particular manner of appropria-
tion to the more straightforward determination of whether the plaintiff
was identified typifies the expansive view.
III. MODERNIZING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Despite the progress thus far, the interests of publicity plaintiffs are
still not completely protected.' 22 Advertising has evolved from the visual
and print emphasis predominant at Haelan's time to its present elec-
tronic incarndtion, which is directed toward the ears as well as the
113. See id. at 398, 280 N.W.2d at 137.
114. See id., 280 N.W.2d at 138; see also J. McCarthy, supra note 29, § 4.9, at 4-50; cf
Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622, 396 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664
(1977) (mem.) (party hats, New Years Eve, "Auld Lang Syne"); Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447
F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (nickname and portrait).
115. See Hirsch, 90 Wis. 2d at 398, 280 N.W.2d at 137-38.
116. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
117. See id. at 833.
118. See id. at 832-33.
119. See id. at 835.
120. See id. at 836.
121. See id. at 835 ("If the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has
been an invasion of his right [of publicity] whether or not his 'name or likeness' is used.
[Plaintiff's] identity may be exploited even if his name, John W. Carson, or his picture is
not used.").
122. Endorsements can be made by means other than name or likeness. See Estate of
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (plaintiff's performing style); supra
text accompanying notes 89, 94, 110-11, 117-18; see also Halpern, supra note 3, at 1244;
Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and Humorous Commentary,
35 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225, 253-54 (1962); Comment, Torts-Libel-'"Passing Off" of Actor's
Voice-Appropriation of Another's Personality Without His Consent-An Equitable Right
of Privacy?, 39 Can. B. Rev. 409, 411 (1961).
Celebrity voiceovers in television commercials have become commonplace. As an ex-
ample, note recently how the voice of Jimmy Stewart was invoked to extol the virtues of
Campbell's soup. See USA Today, Oct. 14, 1988, at 9B, cols. 2-5. Mr. Stewart is never
seen in the ad, yet his voice gives the undeniable imprimatur of approval to the soup's
cure-all capabilities. See id. The use of popular songs has also proven to be an effective
way to connect with a young demographic. See Miller, supra note 103, at 40-42.
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eyes.' 2 3 But while the popularity of aural endorsements by voiceover and
song grows, courts, for the most part, remain mired in name or likeness
tradition.124 The resulting immunity in most jurisdictions renders the
use of sound-alikes a lawful, and profitable, 125 alternative to engaging the
actual celebrity. In Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,' 26 however, the court ac-
knowledged the impact of aural advertising upon vocally recognizable
celebrities.'27 It brought them under the publicity umbrella by ex-
panding the right's scope without straying from the right's principles. 2
The absorption of advertising developments into the right of public-
ity's contours logically follows the right's purported goal-protection of
the celebrity's economic interest in her own exploitation. Since this eco-
nomic interest can now be thwarted by appropriating a celebrity's voice,
the right of publicity should subsume the attribute of voice in order to
provide a remedy to victims of vocal larceny.1
29
Most courts and state legislatures, however, have failed to acknowl-
edge the relevance of advertisers' sonic sales pitches even though the
same purpose and policies 130 that prompted adoption of the right to pro-
tect name and likeness now justify its application to vocal appropria-
tion.' The right's goal of placing the celebrity in control of the
commercial use of her persona is couched not in terms of name and like-
ness, but includes those terms by referring broadly to identity.3 2 There-
fore, clarification of what is meant by identity should sharpen the
frontiers of the right of publicity. 133
Although intangible in nature, identity should encompass any trait or
123. See J. Seldin, The Golden Fleece 255-61 (1963); W. Weilbacher, Advertising 12
(1979).
124. See supra note 47 and accompanying text; cases cited supra note 17.
125. See infra note 139.
126. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
127. See id. at 463.
128. See id. at 463-64.
129. Celebrity plaintiffs have been demanding protection for their vocal identities ever
since the advent of voice-associative marketing, but courts have been grudgingly slow in
complying. See cases cited supra note 17.
130. The policy of preventing unjust enrichment provides the backbone of the right of
publicity. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576
(1977); Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 1983).
Commentators express a secondary concern, that of eradicating deceptive business
practices. See Felcher & Rubin, supra note 11, at 1600; Note, Digital Sound Sampling,
Copyright and Publicity: Protecting Against the Electronic Appropriation of Sounds, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 1723, 1740 (1987). But see J. McCarthy, supra note 29, § 2.4, at 2-15
(this policy is more legitimately an unfair competition concern).
131. Cf Ausness, The Right of Publicity: A "Haystack in a Hurricane", 55 Temp. L.Q.
977, 990-91 (1982) (discussing "recognition values"-aspects of identity by which plain-
tiff is recognized).
132. See, eg., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988); Bi-Rite
Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); J. McCarthy, supra
note 29, § 4.9, at 4-48 to 4-49; Frazer, supra note 6, at 307; supra note 5 and accompany-
ing text.
133. Since infringements of the right turn upon whether the plaintiff's identity was
invoked, see, e.g., Carson, 698 F.2d at 835; Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,
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characteristic that identifies a person.134 Such a definition provides three
benefits. First, it acknowledges that identity may be conveyed in a
number of ways, as opposed to the shortsighted limitations of name and
visual likeness. Second, it uncouples the right of publicity from unneces-
sarily restrictive precedent 135 by making non-qualified identification of
the plaintiff the key to infringement. Third, it accords with the purpose
behind the right. Once the plaintiff is identified, she has lost control of
the commercial use of her identity. Thus, fixing liability upon the appro-
priator's identification of the plaintiff by any means enables the celebrity
to better control the exploitation of her persona. Since people may be
recognized by their voices as readily as by their faces, 13 6 no reason exists
to confine the legal definition of identity to name and visual image.
137
Finally, the policies behind the right-preventing unjust enrichment and
freeing the public from deceptive business practices 13s -are universal
legal goals that do not discriminate among name, likeness and voice.
139
CONCLUSION
Motschenbacher, Midler, Hirsch and Carson form the vanguard of
right of publicity law because they emphasize that publicity rights flow
from the entire persona and not simply from name or likeness. Those
traits are merely the obvious aspects of identity that advertisers have tra-
ditionally used to exploit a celebrity's endorsement value. The added di-
mension of sound in the media of radio and television provides a new
way to convey the impression of celebrity endorsement. By linking a
celebrity's voice or song with a product, an advertiser can create an en-
1282 (D. Minn. 1970); J. McCarthy, supra note 5, at 1709, the scope of identity deter-
mines the nature of infringements. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
134. Identification can be made in a variety of ways. See Carson, 698 F.2d at 836
(plaintiff identified by phrase associated with him); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
90 Wis. 2d 379, 397, 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (1979) (plaintiff identified by nickname and
the context in which it was used); see also Felcher & Rubin, supra note 11, at 1601;
Halpern, supra note 3, at 1244. Cf. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language 654 (W. Morris ed. 1981) (identity defined: "2. The set of behavioral or per-
sonal characteristics by which an individual is recognizable. . .
135. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
136. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463; Lahr v. Adell Chem. Co., 300 F.2d 256, 257 (1st Cir.
1962); Netterville, supra note 122, at 253.
137. But see Booth v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 362 F. Supp. 343, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(complaining that Shirley Booth's vocal characterization as "Hazel" is too abstract to be
protected).
138. See supra note 130.
139. The focus of unjust enrichment is on the appropriator, not the appropriatee. Ad-
vertisers are unjustly enriched whether they imitate a person's appearance or voice, as
they clearly pay less to the imitators. See Wall St. J., March 12, 1987, at 35, col. 1.
Similarly, the issue in preventing public deception is whether the public is likely to be
confused by the alleged wrongful conduct, not which characteristic confuses. Vocal as
well as visual imposters are capable of causing confusion. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he defendants here used an imitation to convey
the impression that Midler was singing for them."); see also Sim v. H.J. Heinz Co., [1959]
1 W.L.R. 313, 315 (C.A.) (English court of appeals).
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dorsement without the visual presence of the endorser. However, the
advent of voice-associative marketing has exposed an aural loophole in
the traditional name and likeness precedent. By exploiting the law's in-
adequacy, clever advertisers are able to steal the identities of vocally rec-
ognizable celebrities. Therefore, states should adopt a right of publicity
that embraces the attribute of voice in order to conform the right to the
realities of modem advertising and to respond to the harm the right was
created to prevent. 1" Otherwise, a valuable endorsement may be had for
a song. 141
Leonard A. Wohl
140. See Sim, 1 W.L.R. at 317 (It would "be a grave defect in the law if it were possible
... to make use of the voice of another.., without his consent.").
141. See Midler, 849 F.2d at 463 ("The singer manifests herself in the song. To imper-
sonate her voice is to pirate her identity.").
